Hume says that we make moral distinctions. That is, we distinguish between right and wrong. Now Hume knows that some people deny that there is such a distinction: there are moral relativists, people who claim that there really is no right and wrong. But Hume says: these people may claim they think this, but they’re either lying to us or are really lying to themselves. At the end of the day, the avowed relativist does think that some things are right and other things are wrong. And Hume’s basic gesture is to say: don’t even engage with these people. You won’t win that argument, and it’s not worth even trying. This is, by the way, not dissimilar to a claim Sartre will make about the anti-semite: trying to have an argument with them is basically a waste of time; you have to respect the rules of debate and discussion, but they don’t. Continue reading “Hume’s Moral Enquiry”
Looking back at the class on the philosophy of the environment I’ve just concluded, it seems to me — in good Hegelian fashion — that only now am I in a place to talk about the course’s methodology. To design a syllabus is a matter of selection, and every selection is politically as well as conceptually informed. Continue reading “On the Concept of Nature Today”
Capitalism, Jason Moore argues, is a system of organizing nature in which the aim is the accumulation of surplus-value and the means are twofold: the exploitation of labor-power and the appropriation of unpaid work and energy from human and nonhuman natures. Following Marx, he contends that the capitalist manner of organizing commodity production enables the extraction of surplus-value, but that those same dynamics lead to a decline in the rate of profit; this leads to crises which, Moore adds, can only be resolved by the production and appropriation of new cheap natures that offset the rising costs of production. Continue reading “Accumulation and Ecological Surplus”
1. In De Corpore, Hobbes writes: ‘A primary proposition is one in which the predicate is a name which explains the subject by means of a number of names.’ The example immediately given is the primary proposition: ‘A human is a rational, animated body’, which progressively reveals multiple determinations or aspects of the single given subject, in this case a human. This, Hobbes tells us, is what it is to be a definition, and the sense of such claims constitute truths that are indemonstrable in principle. He goes on: ‘There are some who add certain other propositions, which they call “primary” or “principles”, namely axioms or common notions. However, they are not really principles, because they can be proved (even if their self-evidence means that they do not need to be proved).’ (Hobbes, De Corpore, §3.9) And yet it is not clear how an axiom or common notion would be proven, since they are neither propositions nor definitions. Continue reading “What is an axiom?”
This is a response I gave to a paper entitled ‘Leibniz on Place’ by Jen Nguyen at DePaul’s philosophy graduate conference yesterday, 2.11.2017.
Nguyen’s paper raises a fascinating series of issues in the context of Leibniz’s metaphysics, which to my mind come down to this central question: where is a place? In some ways, as she notes, Leibniz’s view on place is commonsensical enough: a place will turn out to be a point of view on the world; this is its intrinsic determination, as opposed to the purely extrinsic or formal definition, according to which a place is a set of coordinates in abstract three-dimensional space. And if this squares with common sense, it’s due to a strange sort of phenomenological intuition, rather like how, to borrow from Wilfrid Sellars’ terminology, we sense an incompleteness in the ‘scientific image’ of the world and supplement it with the ‘manifest image’. We want to say: no, this place, this room, is not defined by the amount of space, the quantitative distance between the walls, the placement of the windows, the positions of these tables and chairs; rather it is a matter of the way we perceive it, what it opens up for us, how we are determined within it, a question of perspective and orientation, affect and delimitation: it is how we express it. Continue reading “Place and Expression”
as academia.edu begins to ramp up its efforts at extracting surplus-value from the unpaid labor of academics by encouraging competitive expenditure and fostering hierarchical stratification, it seemed like a good time to make steps toward jumping ship.
this blog will serve as my professional homepage in lieu of anything better. on it you find some basic information about me, a cv, a select collection of my writings, and some teaching documents.
I am also considering using the space to do what blogs are made for — blogging. but I have never been good at keeping up with that sort of activity, as anyone who may have encountered my previous blog will know. the reasons for this are numerous and obvious enough not to be worth enumerating.
thanks for being with me here, at the end of the world.